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Who Holds the Real Veto: Use of Force and the Trusteeship Analogy
It is a well-known fact that except when a country is defending herself from an armed 
attack, all recourse to force must be authorized by the Security Council.1 In early 2003, 
when President Bush became frustrated at the reluctance of the UN Security Council to 
authorize the use of force against Iraq for stalling on the weapons inspections regime, he 
told the world in no uncertain terms that America would attack Iraq alone if necessary.2
This, of course, is not the first time a country has claimed that the impotence of the 
Security Council should not stand in the way of what is otherwise practically just and 
even morally legitimate. Indeed, five years earlier, in Kosovo, NATO acted without prior
Security Council authorization as well. What I want to explore in this article is the 
question of whether countries retain a residual right to act outside of such authorization 
on the basis of what I call the trusteeship analogy.
A. Justifying The Trusteeship Analogy
In short, what the trusteeship analogy argues is that the Charter is not only a contract 
between member states inter se, or a constitution, but is in fact also an instrument of trust, 
1
 This is undoubtedly the combined effect of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter.
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 In his State of the Union Address (January 28, 2003), President Bush had this to say:
America's purpose is more than to follow a process -- it is to achieve a result: the end of 
terrible threats to the civilized world. All free nations have a stake in preventing sudden 
and catastrophic attacks. And we're asking them to join us, and many are doing so. Yet 
the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others. Whatever action is 
required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the 
American people. (emphasis mine.)
Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html>
where nations vest the responsibility of collective security in the hands of the Security 
Council, giving up a hitherto core element of foreign policy (the ability to use force for 
political gain).3 Where this trust is not exercised in good faith, member states, as 
beneficiaries of that trust, retain a residual power to revoke the trust, thereby denying that 
the Council holds power anymore, or they are entitled to enforce it by themselves. Three 
reasons may be forwarded in support of this proposition: the Charter itself, institutional 
practice, and sheer commonsense. 
Article 2(2) states that all members shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by 
them in accordance with the Charter. There is no reason why this does not apply to 
Security Council members. The reference to “good faith” is, of course, language familiar 
to trust lawyers. It describes a relationship of exclusive loyalty between the fiduciary (the 
Security Council) and the principals (the member states). The concept of loyalty in a 
fiduciary relationship extends beyond our everyday understanding of what loyalty means; 
instead, it conveys a very specific obligation to carry out the purposes expressed in the 
trust instrument (the Charter) without personal profit, or as we say in international law 
speak, vested interest. This means that the Security Council is obligated to make 
decisions that are in the best interests of those who empowered it in the first place. Where 
the trust is breached, there is no more relationship that holds the scheme of collective 
security together, and the power to use force results back to the member states. 
3
 There was concern at San Francisco that the obligation to give up the use of force was not reciprocated by 
a mandatory legal obligation to aid future victims. New Zealand, for instance, proposed that all members of 
the UN should “collectively resist every act of aggression against any member.” 6 U.N.I.C.O., General, 
Commission I, Doc. 810, I/1/30, June 6, 1945, 342. See, THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO 
FORCE 45-51 (2002) While this proposal was not adopted, it clearly demonstrates that the intention was 
for there to be a mutuality in the obligation of states to deny themselves the ability to use force, and the 
obligation of the Security Council to ensure international peace and security. 
Article 24 then goes on to explicate the relationship between Security Council members 
and UN member states as such:
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its 
members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying 
out its duties under this responsibility, the Security Council acts on their 
behalf.
The facial words of the Article appear to be unambiguous support for my proposition. 
Firstly, the act of conferring responsibility suggests that a concomitant right resided in the 
person vesting that power. You cannot delegate an authority without having it in the first 
place. Therefore, Art 24 recognizes that individual nations had a pre-existing right to use 
force, which has now been delegated to the Security Council. Secondly, what is 
authorized is not exclusive responsibility for ensuring prompt and effective action in the 
maintenance of peace and security, but only “primary responsibility.”4 Where the 
Security Council acts, and is able to act, it has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.5
However, where it fails to act, or unable to act, a secondary responsibility opens up to 
those who can or are willing, be it the General Assembly or individual nations 
themselves. Thirdly, Art 24 makes it clear that in the exercise of its responsibility, the 
4 Certain Expenses Case, infra, note 10
5
 Article 12 of the UN Charter says that the General Assembly is precluded from making any 
recommendation with respect to any dispute or issue currently being dealt with by the Security Council.
Security Council acts, at all times, on behalf of – and therefore for the benefit of –
member states. The metaphorical analogy to a trust is therefore complete. There is a 
vesting of a power in a trustee, which exercises that power in accordance with certain 
standards enumerated in the trust instrument. The trustee remains, at all times, 
accountable to the principals, who reserve an authority to act where the trustee does not. 
There is strong evidence that this was the intention behind the idea of collective security. 
In fact, at San Francisco, France proposed that “should the Council not succeed in 
reaching a decision, the members of the organization reserve to themselves the right to 
act as the may consider necessary in the interest of peace, right and justice.”6 While this 
may not have been adopted in the final draft of the Charter, Articles 2(2) and 24 do carry 
an implicit understanding that the Security Council was not a power unto itself, but 
derived it from member nations, for the benefit of them. The very idea of collective 
security was, after all, to get countries to forfeit the use of force in exchange for more 
powerful countries to police the murky waters of international peace and security. In 
1999, in his report to the General Assembly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
somewhat surprisingly, warned that:
The Charter requires the Council to be the defender of the common 
interest, and unless it is seen to be so in an era of human rights, 
6
 Minutes of the Thirty-Seventh Meeting of the United States Declaration, San Francisco, May 12, 1945, 1 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, 674 at 679-80.
interdependence and globalization, there is a danger that others could seek 
to take its place.7
What Kofi Annan meant by “others” taking the place of the Council is unclear, but I 
think it does allude to the fact that the Council is beholden to the international 
community, rather than – as it may be thought – the other way around.8
Institutional practice has also recognized this principle. In 1950, America, frustrated by 
the deadlock in the Security Council over deployment of troops in Korea because of the 
Soviet Union, went to the General Assembly, arguing that it was crucial not to leave the 
United Nations impotent. The General Assembly voted 52-5 and adopted what is now 
referred to as the “Uniting for Peace” resolution,9 which authorizes the General Assembly 
to call an emergency special session to recommend collective measures where the 
Security Council is paralyzed, as long as seven Council members, or a majority of UN 
members, request such a session. The Uniting for Peace resolution has now been used 
during the Suez crisis, and the deployment of UN military action in Congo. In the Certain 
Expenses Case, the International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion, confirmed the 
legality of the resolution by reasoning that the implication in giving the Council “primary 
7 54 G.A.O.R., 4th Plen. Meeting, September 20, 1999, A/54/PV.4, at  3  
8
 In fact, the veto was given to the Permanent Members in return for the contribution of their political and 
economic powers, which were seen as important ingredients for collective security. This never quite 
happened. The UN has no standing army, and the largest UN contributor, Japan, is not a permanent 
member of the Council. Therefore, in a sense, there has already been a betrayal of trust by the permanent 
members.
9
 G.A. Res. 377(V). G.A.O.R., 5th Sess., 302nd Plen. Meeting, 3 November 1950, A/PV.302, 341 at 347
responsibility” was that the General Assembly retained “secondary” responsibility that 
could be exercised when the former was stymied.10
Understandably, such practice never went as far as acknowledging that individual 
countries also retained this secondary right. I have two responses. Firstly, by suggesting 
that the General Assembly could act where the Security Council could not, it recognized
that the latter’s authority and mandate derives from the democratic will of the Assembly. 
Therefore it is not much of a leap to argue that ultimate power comes from the individual 
states themselves (albeit acting collectively in the Assembly). Secondly, where there is 
still recourse to diplomatic channels like the General Assembly, this is, of course, the 
preferred route. But in the world of politics, the General Assembly is not itself immune 
from the possibility of a deadlock, or a situation where the requisite majority cannot be 
reached.11 In such cases, as I have argued above, individual nations retain a right to act 
unilaterally.
Indeed, while there has never been an explicit endorsement of my theory in institutional 
practice, there have been occasions that seem to suggest, implicitly, that the failure of the 
10 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, 1962 ICJ 163 at 164. In 
another ICJ decision, the Court also used the language of trusteeship:
All States should bear in mind that the entity injured by the illegal presence of South 
Africa in Namibia is a people which must look to the international community for 
assistance in its progress towards the goals for which the sacred trust was instituted.
Legal Consequences for States of the Continuing Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep 16 at para 87-
116 (emphasis mine.) 
11
 There is an added complication in that while the Security Council can authorize force, the General 
Assembly may only make recommendations. Therefore a resolution by the Assembly, say, that countries 
stop a genocide in a particular country is not legally binding on a non-consenting country. 
Security Council to promptly authorize action in what are intuitively compelling 
circumstances lends legitimacy to what may otherwise be a technical violation of the law. 
For example, in a Security Council debate on NATO’s actions, Slovenia appears to have 
justified NATO’s actions by pinning the blame on the failure of the Council to act in 
concert in what was undeniably a massive humanitarian crisis. In other words, she argued 
that the inability of the Council to fulfill its role nullified the apparent illegality of 
NATO’s action:
We regret the fact that not all permanent members were willing to act in 
accordance with their special responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security under the United Nations Charter. Their 
apparent absence of support has prevented the Council from using its 
powers to the full extent and from authorizing the action which is 
necessary to put an end to the violations of its resolutions.12
When the Security Council convened two days later to vote on Russia’s draft resolution 
condemning the illegality of the attacks,13 Slovenia commented:
Furthermore, the draft resolution completely fails to reflect the practice of 
the Security Council, which has several times, including on recent 
occasions, chosen to remain silent at a time of military action by a regional
12
 S.C.O.R. (LIV), 3988th Meeting, 24 March 1999, at 6-7 
 
13
 Draft Resolution, S/1999/328, 26 March 1999. The draft resolution was voted down 3-12.    
organization aimed at the removal of a regional threat to peace and 
security.14
Slovenia is factually correct.15 But what is more significant is the recognition that 
individual countries, or coalitions, can act outside of Council authorization without 
reprisal where there is an expectation or knowledge that the Council will not, or is 
unable, to authorize the action despite the practical necessity of the situation.
The last basis on which I propose this trusteeship analogy is commonsense. Kofi Annan 
put it in stark terms, when he asked:
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is 
the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might 
ask, not in the context of Kosovo but in the context of Rwanda, if, in those 
dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States had 
been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did not receive 
prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside 
and allowed the horror to unfold?16
14
 S.C.O.R. (LIV), 3989th Meeting, 26 March 1999, at 3
15
 For instance, between 1989 and 1999, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was 
involved in two peace-keeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone outside of Security Council 
authorization which is required under Article 53. Yet there was virtually no criticism of their actions, and in 
Sierra Leone, the Council commended ECOWAS for its role in the resolution of the conflict. Press Release, 
Presidential Statement, SC/6481, 26 February 1998. These have been characterized as “ex post facto 
approval” of ECOWAS’ actions. See, FRANCK, supra, note 3, at 155-162.   
16 54 G.A.O.R, 4th Plen. Meeting, September 20, 1999, A/54/PV.4, at  2  
The instinctive answer must be a resounding no. Sometimes, countries may refuse to act 
for reasons wholly unconnected with the ground situation. Domestic politics may play a 
role; international alliances may influence; or occasionally a country may face a unique 
threat that no other country can appreciate. America, for instance, will always remain 
more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than, say, France will ever be, and as a result, may 
feel more justified in preempting the threat Iraq could pose in the future than France 
would. In such circumstances, it may well be necessary to understand that countries can, 
and should, have a residual right to act where there is a compelling reason to, and where 
there is paralysis in the system.
I do not mean to suggest that every veto can be circumvented in this way. This would 
render the system of checks-and-balances within the UN structure nugatory. After all, the 
Charter does envisage the possibility that not every country will get its way all the time. 
In fact, that is the whole point of a multilateral collective security design. There will need 
to be evidence of bad faith, or at least a reckless disregard for their duties in ensuring
prompt and effective action, in order to employ the trusteeship argument. It is beyond the 
scope of this article to examine the specific circumstances under which the trusteeship 
analogy can invoked,17 but I do want to point out that apart from institutional safeguards, 
17
 Such instances will probably have to be decided on a case-by-case basis, although I would suggest that 
the test of good faith may include, possibly among others, the idea that the Security Council should be able 
to demonstrate a substrata of fact to which the decision is reasonably linked. Even in the law of trusts, there 
is no definitive elucidation of what good faith is, apart from the fact that it forms the core of a fiduciary’s 
duty, and appears to be a matter of matter of inference from the surrounding facts. Where the Council is 
apathetic when there is an overwhelming practical or moral prerogative to act, such as in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Kosovo, this should be sufficient to establish either a lack of good faith, or at least a reckless 
member states are also particularly vulnerable to domestic and international criticism by
the international media, which has also been an extremely powerful weapon against 
reckless leaders bent on ignoring the general prohibition against unilateral use of force 
based on spurious grounds. What the BBC did to British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 
domestic popularity,18 and the inquiry he now faces over charges of deceiving Parliament
should not be forgotten in a hurry. Even President Bush’s popularity has dipped 
significantly after the Iraqi war.19 This political counterbalance is important because my 
argument, admittedly, places the initial power to decide when there has been bad faith in 
the hands of the very countries who want to use force unilaterally.20 However, political 
credibility, domestic and international, should also put it in their interest not to abuse the 
argument.
B. Legal or Political Question?
My argument assumes that such exceptions to the general requirement for Security 
Council approval in the use of force outside of self-defense should be a legal one, rather 
failure to carry out its primary responsibilities. As always, the use of force should be necessary, 
proportional and a last resort. 
18
 61% of voters are said to be unhappy with Tony Blair’s performance in office, and his rating for 
trustworthiness has also fallen. See, Alan Travis and Patrick Wintour, “Blair’s Popularity Ratings Nosedive 
In Wake of Hutton Inquiry Revelations,” The Guardian, September 25, 2003, available at 
<http://politics.guardian.co.uk/polls/story/0,11030,1049272,00.html>
19
 Only 53% of the American public support Bush’s handling of Iraq, 45% believe the White House 
mishandled the analysis of Iraq’s threat, and 38% said Bush had purposely misled the public.  See “Bush’s 
Popularity Falls,” July 13, 2003, available at <http://au.news.yahoo.com/030711/2/kt3e.html> 
20
 Of course, victims of illegal incursions may seek redress at the International Court of Justice. My point is 
that the political counterbalance will be an important consideration when nations first decide whether to use 
force unilaterally, as it almost always is even now. 
than a political one.21 More crucial, it is a legal exception found within the structure of 
the Charter itself, rather than from outside. In the aftermath of Kosovo, nervous 
international lawyers, wanting to preserve ‘the law’ and yet recognizing the moral 
urgency of the situation, sought to characterize NATO’s action as “illegal yet 
legitimate.”22 It might have been hoped that by maintaining that such behavior was 
illegal, it would make countries tempted to act in similar fashion to think twice since it 
would continue to attract the stain of illegality. That, however, seems to be mere 
sophistry. If an act is illegal, it is illegal. Saying it is illegal yet legitimate is akin to 
saying murder is unlawful, but if you can prove you murdered someone who was evil, 
then we will let you off the hook. It is nothing more than a glorified euphemism for 
vigilante justice based on flimsy and subjective notions of morality, more likely to 
advance the unilateral diktat23 of powerful countries than the rule of international law. I 
want to put forward three observations.
Firstly, the judicial response from the International Court of Justice, is, I submit, 
unfavorable to an argument that political or moral exigencies can justify breaking the 
law. In the Corfu Channel Case,24 the Court said:
21
 This would mean that countries would huddle with each other and agree not to oppose certain unilateral 
action even though it is illegal. Kosovo is a recent example of this, where a great majority of countries did 
not raise any objections to NATO’s use of force without Security Council authorization.  
22 See, FRANCK, supra, note 3, at 174-191, arguing for a doctrine of mitigation; and MARTTI 
KOSKENNIEMI, “ ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ – Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International 
Law,”  (2002) 65 MLR 159 where he argues a need to balance formalism (recognizing the need for 
objective limits) with ethics (recognizing the emotional immediacy of the particular situation) in what he 
calls ‘situational ethics.’  
23 S.C.O.R. (LIV), 3988th Meeting, 24 March 1999, at 2
Certainly, the Court recognizes the Albanian Government's complete 
failure to carry out its duties after the explosions and the dilatory nature of 
its diplomatic notes as extenuating circumstances for the action of the 
United Kingdom. But, to ensure respect for international law, of which it 
is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy 
constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.25
Here, the ICJ held that the United Kingdom was in breach of Albania’s sovereignty 
despite acknowledging the so-called extenuating circumstances; therefore seemingly 
rejecting the notion that international law permits pleas of mitigation.
Secondly, I would suggest that the analogy to domestic law, sometimes used to 
demonstrate the need to bridge legality and morality by allowing a set of defenses, is not 
complete. This resort to what is “just and moral”26 is nowhere supported by the text of the 
Charter. This is very different from domestic law where such defenses are governed and 
explicitly recognized on the statutes. This is crucial because as much as we can make 
allowances for the evolution of international law, they must be supported by reference to 
24 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania), Judgment of 9th April, 1949, ICJ Reports, 1949, 4. 
This case involved a situation where the Royal Navy decided to sweep Albanian waters after a stray mine 
had hit a British vessel. 
25
 Ibid, at 35 (emphasis mine.) Professor Franck argues that the Teheran Hostages Case is another example 
supporting the doctrine that extenuating circumstances can mitigate an illegality. See, FRANCK, supra, 
note 3, at 184-5. In that case, the Court did not pronounce on the illegality of the United States’ action. But, 
this was because it had no bearing on the legality of Iran’s action and not because it absolved the US from 
its actions. If anything, an earlier part of the judgment found that the accusation that the US was conducting 
illegal activities in Iran did not justify or mitigate Iran’s own wrongdoing. (United States v Iran, Judgment 
of 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports, 1980, 3 at17-18, para 32; and 39 at para 80-89.)
26 See, FRANCK, supra, note 3, at 180 
the Charter, which is the only universally accepted legal basis for the use of force.27 The 
reason why this is so critical is not the subject of this article but suffice it to say that the 
Charter, being an expression of agreement between member states, must be the reference 
point in deciding what nations can do to one another. Furthermore, in domestic law, clear 
standards of adjudication are set down as to what circumstances can rise to the level of a 
valid defense. Putting exceptions to the use of force without authorization outside the 
legal framework means that we are held ransom to whatever definition whatever country 
wishes to put on justice and morality. Placing such exceptions firmly within the 
framework of international law, with reference to the Charter, at least allows victims of 
such unilateral use of force a legal basis on which to take their case to the ICJ, or allows 
the Security Council to ask for an advisory opinion of the Court, where the latter can set 
about formulating proper legal standards.28
Thirdly, as a practical matter, there is no distinction between legality and legitimacy in 
the conduct of international affairs. In domestic law, that distinction – maintained by the 
concept of mitigation – is important because it has a practical role in reducing the 
severity of the offense and hence in the sentence imposed on the offender. In 
international law, when a country says that its acts are legitimate or justified, it does not 
27
 UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, 54 GAOR, 4th Plenary Meeting, September 20, 1999, A/54/PV.4, at  
2 (para 66)
28
 It goes without saying that the Security Council’s decisions are not subject to the judicial review of the 
ICJ. However, the ICJ continues to be the standard bearer of international law. In its 2002 Report to the 
General Assembly, 57 GAOR, 6 September 2002, A/57/4, it noted that 189 countries were parties to the 
Statutes of the Court, and 63 had submitted a declaration submitting themselves to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court. It also observed more multilateral treaties were including the ICJ as having 
jurisdiction over disputes arising from them. This shows the sustained respect of countries to the role of law 
and legal standards in the conduct of their affairs. 
seek to accept some legal sanction or responsibility. Instead, it seeks to argue quite the 
opposite. They mean to say: this is something we should not have to accept any legal 
sanction or responsibility for whatsoever. In a debate on a draft resolution tabled by 
Russia condemning the Kosovo attacks as being outside the law, the US said:
The draft resolution before us today alleges that NATO is acting in 
violation of the United Nations Charter. This turns the truth on its head. 
The United Nations Charter does not sanction armed assaults upon ethnic 
groups, or imply that the international community should turn a blind eye 
to a growing humanitarian disaster.
NATO’s actions are completely justified. They are necessary to stop the 
violence and to prevent a further deterioration of peace and stability in the 
region.29
Again, in 2003, Australia, one of the supporters of the war on Iraq, declared as such:
Australia is a part of the coalition to disarm Iraq because we believe an 
Iraq with weapons of mass destruction represents a grave threat to our 
security and to international security. Australia hopes that Iraq can be 
disarmed soon with a minimum of harm to civilians and to coalition 
29
 S.C.O.R. (LIV), 3989th Meeting, 26 March 1999, at 5 (emphasis mine.)
forces. Our participation in the coalition is in complete accordance with 
international law.30
In neither instance did proponents of the use of force outside Security Council accept that 
what they were doing were illegal. Australia made it quite clear that the extenuating 
situation in Iraq nullified – not mitigated – the illegality of their act. I would submit 
therefore, that as a practical matter, no one but academics make that fine distinction 
between legality and legitimacy. All that distinction does, really, is to perpetuate the idea 
that law can exist without legitimacy, and that legitimacy can exist without law, when, in 
truth, “the Security Council is the primary institution that gives legality and legitimacy to 
our collective efforts to secure peace and security in the world.”31
Therefore, to suggest that exceptions to the use of force should be governed by the 
realpolitik of the situation is both dangerous and intellectually sloppy. If there is an 
exception, it should be found within the Charter and the legal norms it has created, rather 
from some amorphous conception of what is legitimate. Placing exceptions within a 
legal framework does not, of course, absolve us from examining the ground realities on a 
case-by-case basis; but it does provide a means by which we can develop a coherent 
principle that is consistent, rather than antagonistic, with the rest of the Charter.
C. Conclusion
30
  S.C.O.R. (LIV), 4726th Meeting, 26 March 2003, at 27 (emphasis mine.)
31
 S.C.O.R. (LIV), 4726th Meeting, 26 March 2003, at 20. 
Without doubt, the general prohibition on the use of force outside of self-defense or 
Security Council authorization is extremely desirable. But if experience is the life of the 
law, then history tells us that we will inevitably face situations where the general 
proposition cannot be accommodated, and must give way. The hard question of what 
recourse an individual country has when the Security Council or the General Assembly is 
unwilling or unable to act in compelling circumstances, is, I hope answered by my 
justification of a general principle that says that the Security Council is a trustee of 
individual nations’ right to use force, and where it fails to exercise this trust for the 
benefit of those nations, the latter have a right to use force without authorization. The real 
veto, it would seem, lies in the hands of “equally sovereign” states.32
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 It is sometimes argued that the Security Council stands in the way of a UN system that is supposedly 
based on the notion of sovereign equality as laid down in Art 2(1) of the Charter. This analysis should 
restore some faith in that notion by recognizing that the ultimate power of the Security Council derives 
from the free will of the individual member states.  
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